--------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Editor's note; Stories pierce veil of secrecy Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: Lawrence K. Beaupre --------------------------------------------------------------------- Two thousand miles from its banana plantations in Central America, Chiquita Brands International Inc. is one of Cincinnati's most prominent corporations. It is also one of its most secretive. Controlled by financier Carl H. Lindner Jr., whose aversion to the press is legendary, Chiquita nevertheless has been thrust prominently into the public realm in recent years. As the stories on A1 and in this section describe, Chiquita is involved in political, environmental, legal and labor controversies in many parts of the world. A year ago, The Cincinnati Enquirer decided to look beyond the company's press releases to gain a better understanding of how the Cincinnati-based banana giant operates. Reporters Mike Gallagher and Cameron McWhirter undertook a wide- ranging investigation into Chiquita's business practices. After conducting scores of interviews in the United States and reviewing numerous public and internal documents, Mr. Gallagher and Mr. McWhirter traveled late last summer to Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and the Caribbean islands of St. Lucia and Dominica. They also traveled to Brussels, Antwerp, Vancouver, New York and Washington, D.C. They spoke to a wide range of sources, including farm laborers and managers, environmentalists, government officials, financial experts, lawyers, professors and others. They interviewed numerous Chiquita executives, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. Extensive documentation also was provided by sources or obtained elsewhere. Those records included more than 2,000 copies of taped voice mail messages. These were provided by a high-level source who was one of several Chiquita executives with authority over the company's voice mail system. The source also provided copies of the same tapes to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which has launched its own investigation into Chiquita. Chiquita executives often used voice mail as internal memoranda, often "copying" other executives, sometimes as many as five or six, with the same message. Many of the messages were highly detailed. Chiquita executives refused repeated requests for interviews. Instead, they designated lawyers from the Washington, D.C., office of Kirkland & Ellis to take questions and provide company answers in writing. There was none of the give-and-take of a normal interview. Chiquita, through its lawyers, provided hundreds of pages of comments and documents, though some of it was not responsive to the actual question asked. In several cases, Chiquita chose not to provide any response at all. We are confident that thorough reporting for more than a year has resulted in an accurate and eye-opening portrait. Readers with information or comments may contact us by e-mail at enterprise@enquirer.com or write to me at The Cincinnati Enquirer, 312 Elm St., Cincinnati, OH 45201. About the staff Mike Gallagher, 40, investigative reporter, joined the Enquirer in 1995. He reported and wrote the Enquirer's award-winning series in 1996 on problems with the cleanup of the uranium-processing plant at Fernald. E-mail: 75057,3062@Compuserve.com Cameron McWhirter, 34, has been an investigative reporter with the Enquirer since 1994. His award-winning projects have included an examination of dangerous flaws in the nation's interstate parole system. In 1996, the newspaper sent him to Bosnia to report on the war's impact. E-mail: cmcwhirter@enquirer.com David Wells, 46, local news editor at the Enquirer, has been with the newspaper since 1974. He oversees the local news department and personally directs the investigative team. Designed by Ron Huff and John Humenik. Graphics by Randy Mazzola. Maps by Ron Cosby. All photographs in this report by Mike Gallagher, Cameron McWhirter or taken from Enquirer files unless otherwise noted. Photo of Sam Zemurray by Elliot Elisofen, Life Magazine, copyright Time, Inc. Historic photos on C18 were taken from The Story of the Banana (United Fruit Co., 1921). Due to production limitations, Spanish grammatical markers have not been included in the text. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Enquirer investigation finds questionable business practices, dangerous use of pesticides, fear among plantation workers; Chiquita: An empire built on controversy Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: MIKE GALLAGHER AND CAMERON MCWHIRTER --------------------------------------------------------------------- A year-long investigation by The Cincinnati Enquirer has found that Chiquita Brands International Inc., the world's largest banana company, is engaged in a range of questionable business practices. Chiquita, based in Cincinnati at 250 E. 5th St., has disputed suggestions that any of its practices are improper. The Enquirer investigation took reporters to the sweltering lowlands of Central America, where bananas are grown, as well as to Canada, Belgium, New York and Washington. Findings are outlined in a special 18-page section in today's Enquirer. These findings include: Chiquita secretly controls dozens of supposedly independent banana companies. It does so through elaborate business structures designed to avoid restrictions on land ownership and national security laws in Central American countries. The structures also are aimed at limiting unions on its farms. Chiquita and its subsidiaries are engaged in pesticide practices that threaten the health of workers and nearby residents, despite an agreement with an environmental group to adhere to certain safety standards. Despite that environmental agreement, Chiquita subsidiaries use pesticides in Central America that are not allowed for use in either the United States or Canada, or in one or more of the 15 countries in the European Union. A worker on a Chiquita subsidiary farm died late last year after exposure to toxic chemicals in a banana field, according to a local coroner's report. Hundreds of people in a Costa Rican barrio have been exposed to a toxic chemical emitting from the factory of a Chiquita subsidiary. Employees of Chiquita and a subsidiary were involved in a bribery scheme in Colombia that has come to the attention of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Two employees have been forced to resign. Chiquita fruit-transport ships have been used to smuggle cocaine into Europe. Authorities seized more than a ton of cocaine (worth up to $33 million in its pure form) from seven Chiquita ships in 1997. Although the company was unaware and did not approve of the illegal shipments, problems were traced to lax security on its Colombian docks. Security guards have used brute force to enforce their authority on plantations operated or controlled by Chiquita. In an internationally controversial case, Chiquita called in the Honduran military to enforce a court order to evict residents of a farm village; the village was bulldozed and villagers run out at gunpoint. On a palm plantation controlled by a Chiquita subsidiary in Honduras, a man was shot to death and another man injured by guards using an illegal automatic weapon. An agent of a competitor has filed a federal lawsuit claiming that armed men led by Chiquita officials tried to kidnap him in Honduras. Chiquita Chairman and CEO Carl H. Lindner Jr., his family and associates made legal but controversial contributions to political figures at a time the company desperately sought U.S. backing in a trade dispute over banana tariffs in Europe. In a statement issued through its attorneys, Chiquita said the company "has been an active and enthusiastic engine for a better way of life throughout the region (and) is a leader in preserving, enhancing and cleaning the environment through Central America." Throughout its investigation, the Enquirer sought to meet with Mr. Lindner and other Chiquita officials, including Keith Lindner, vice chairman, and Steven G. Warshaw, president and chief operating officer. They declined. Instead, the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis in Washington, D.C., was hired to provide company responses to reporters' questions. Chiquita, through its lawyers, provided hundreds of pages of responses, although refusing to address some questions and avoiding direct responses to others. Several high-level sources within Chiquita spoke with reporters on the condition of anonymity, fearing retaliation. They also provided extensive documents and other information including copies of more than 2,000 taped voice mail messages recorded by Chiquita executives. A high-level source told the Enquirer that he has also provided copies of those tape recordings to SEC investigators. SEC sources confirmed that they have the tapes and they are part of an investigation into Chiquita's business practices. SEC and Chiquita sources also confirmed that, in April, SEC investigators issued multiple subpoenas to Chiquita for documents. Enquirer reporters spent a month in Central America and the Caribbean late last summer, visiting plantations, government offices, villages and university research centers. They personally observed practices and spoke with residents, laborers, Chiquita managers and government officials. They obtained hundreds of internal and public documents and interviewed legal, financial and environmental experts in Cincinnati, Brussels, Antwerp, New York, Vancouver and Washington, D.C. Key figures in stories Baker, Lorenzo Dow - Massachusetts sea captain who helpd begin the banana trade in 1870. Bakoczy, Alejandro - chief of security for Chiquita. Binard, Phillippe - delegate general of the European Community Banana Trade Association. Birns, Larry - director of Council on Hemispheric Affairs. A Chiquita critic. Black, Eli - owner of United Fruit Co., who in 1970 changed the company's name to United Brands. Committed suicide in 1975 while the company was under investigation for bribing Latin American officials. Brester, Susan (Chappano) - Chiquita finance executive. Castejon, Amilcar - Honduran lawyer hired by Chiquita to oversee payroll and personnel records of COBALISA, a farm service company. Castro Diaz, Josque Moises - A 21-year-old villager living amid the San Alejo Plantation in Honduras. He was shot and killed by plantation security guards. Coleridge, Ged - Chiquita executive in Belgium concerned with shipping issues. Connoley Sevilla, John - former resident and schoolteacher in the destroyed village of Tacamiche. Escobar Galeano, Carlos Guillermo - bodyguard of Otto Stalinski and expected witness in his federal suit. He was shot to death near his home in Honduras on March 24. Escobar, Renaldo - Chiquita lawyer in Colombia involved in alleged bribery with Chiquita executive Douglas Walker. Flores Discua, Iris Gisela - a lawyer representing the guards and Chiquita's Tela Railroad Co. in a shooting case on the San Alejo plantation. Forton, Jorge - Chiquita executive in Medellin, Colombia, involved in alleged bribery with Mr. Walker and Mr. Escobar. Gleason, Carolyn - Chiquita's trade attorney and registered lobbyist in Washington, D.C. Hills, David - Chiquita lawyer. Holst, Eric - New York coordinator for the "Better Banana" certification program of the Rainforest Alliance. Hughes, G. Philip - ambassador to the Windward Islands under the Bush administration. Later a Chiquita consultant. Kistinger, Robert - Chiquita Banana Group president. Kondritzer, Gerald R. - Chiquita vice president and treasurer. Lindner, Carl H. Jr. - chairman and CEO of Chiquita Brands International Inc. Lindner, Keith - Carl's son and vice chairman of Chiquita Brands International Inc. Marquardt, Sandra - environmental consultant who formerly headed up Greenpeace International efforts to ban U.S. export of pesticides. McBride, Ann - president of Common Cause. Mendoza, Jorge - an official of Chiquita Tela Railroad Co. subsidiary in Honduras who was involved in the destruction of the Tacamiche village. Moore, Robert - president of the International Banana Association, a Washington, D.C., group that lobbies for the banana interests. Murray, Henry - former employee of Chiquita's Tela Railroad subsidiary who is leasing Tacamiche banana land. Obregon, Jose - general manager of the supposedly independent COBALISA, but carried on Tela payroll. Olson, Robert - senior vice president and general counsel for Chiquita Brands International Inc. Ordman, John - Chiquita senior vice president of finance. Palma, Arnaldo - general manager of Chiquita's Honduran operations. Paz, Benjamin - Chiquita official. Ploughman, Dale - Chiquita executive in Antwerp, Belgium, responsible for shipping issues. Raymer, Joel - Chiquita lawyer. Rodriguez, Eugene - Chiquita executive. Rodriguez, Manuel - Chiquita lawyer. Stalinski, Ernst "Otto" - former consultant for Fyffes, a Chiquita competitor, who claims Chiquita agents tried to kidnap him in Honduras in 1990. He has filed a federal suit in Cincinnati against the company. Stephens, Clyde - retired chief of Chiquita Banana Research division. Theodoredis, Roger - Chiquita executive in Cincinnati assigned to investigate problems at the company Polymer subsidiary in Costa Rica. Valerin Bustos, Greddy Mauricio - A worker killed by organophosphate intoxication while working on a Costa Rican plantation controlled by Chiquita. Veliz Tobar, Carlos Ermelindo - union official shot to death on Sept. 30, 1994, on a Chiquita-controlled plantation in Guatemala. Walker, Douglas - Chiquita vice president of operations, fired for participation in a Colombian bribery scheme. Warshaw, Steven G . - Chiquita Brands International Inc. president and chief operating officer. Welsh, Magnes - Chiquita's director of investor relations. Zemurray, Sam "the Banana Man" - architect of the modern banana industry. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revaled: Power, money & control Hidden control crucial to overseas empire Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: MIKE GALLAGHER AND CAMERON MCWHIRTER --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita Brands International Inc., through its subsidiaries, secretly controls dozens of supposedly independent banana companies in Latin America. Chiquita does so through an international trust structure designed to avoid restrictions of land ownership and national security laws. Records obtained by the Enquirer show that Chiquita's executives and lawyers created the trust structure in 1991 and 1992 so the company- controlled entities could: Acquire land in Latin American countries for expanded banana production - even though those nations' laws prohibit and - or limit Chiquita from directly buying property. Buy land in Honduras within 40 kilometers of its borders despite laws that - for national security reasons - prohibit non-Hondurans from owning such land. Eliminate labor unions from many company-controlled banana farms or hinder their activity by forming smaller, supposedly independent companies that appear to be controlled by citizens of the host countries. Chiquita used the trust structure to replace an older system also designed to hide control of many of its Latin American operations. That system is known as a "nominee form of ownership." Under the nominee system - still widely used in some areas - citizens of the host country are made shareholders of the companies and then secretly sign over their shares in blank and give them to Chiquita, company records reveal. Obtaining land to expand its banana production operations in Honduras and other Latin American countries throughout this decade has allowed the Cincinnati-based banana giant to maintain its position as the world's largest banana company. "What Chiquita has done to these foreign nations is deception on a world- wide scale," said Larry Birns, director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), a Washington D.C. based research group specializing in Latin American issues. "Violating the intent of these foreign laws is considered a very serious matter in Latin America," said Mr. Birns. "The problem has always been proving it." Mr. Birns' research on Latin America has been used by Congress, the U.S. State Department and U.S. and foreign embassies. He was critical of Chiquita in recent COHA reports. He supports allegations by Ernst "Otto" Stalinski, a former employee of a competing banana company who has filed a U.S. federal lawsuit claiming that Chiquita and subsidiary officials tried to kidnap him in 1990. Carl H. Lindner Jr., chairman of the Chiquita board and chief executive officer; Keith Lindner, vice chairman; Steven G. Warshaw, president and chief operating officer; and other Chiquita officials declined repeated requests for interviews. Instead, the company hired the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis to represent the company in all dealings with the Enquirer. Through its lawyers, Chiquita provided written responses to Enquirer questions but declined to provide information on any foreign companies owned or controlled by Chiquita. Trust structure created Honduras was the first country in which Chiquita used its trust structure to obscure its control of the banana farms. Chiquita was seeking to expand its operations for greater sales in Eastern Europe. A 1992 Chiquita document entitled "Honduras Operations, Legal Structure Description and Rationale" describes why the company created the trusts and noted the Honduran laws the company considered to be a problem. The document said that historically all banana operations were under Tela Railroad Co., Chiquita's Honduran subsidiary. Because of Honduran land laws, expansion of these holdings was not allowed. The Honduran Constitution doesn't permit foreign land ownership within 40 kilometers of the border. The Honduran Agrarian Reform Law of 1976 does not allow land ownership greater than 250 hectares (about 618 acres), with a grandfather clause for all land owned prior to 1975, the document said. The Honduran government can expropriate land that is owned or controlled in violation of the law. Additionally, any land that stops producing crops can also be expropriated. Honduras did expropriate more than 50,000 acres of Tela Railroad Co. land shortly after the law was passed because the land was not in production, according to Salvatore Rodezno, former deputy minister of political affairs at the Honduran embassy in Washington D.C. As token compensation, the government paid Tela a small amount of cash and low-interest bonds, according to an April 12, 1989 memo by Chiquita lawyer Manuel Rodriguez. Referring to the trusts, another Chiquita legal document stated: "The new managed farms are being set up as a trust under ( Chiquita International Limited) because they are easier to set up and manage and (they) provide a greater confidentiality than the nominee structure." Chiquita executives and lawyers who spoke confidentially to the Enquirer said Mr. Warshaw, Chiquitas's current president and chief operating officer, authorized the international trust structure. Several high-level Chiquita employees said they expressed concern about the trust structure in 1991-92, but their opinions were disregarded. They asked not to be identified for fear of retribution. "Steve (Warshaw) said we were only using loopholes in their laws to do what we wanted," said a Chiquita lawyer opposed to the trust set-up. "This has never sat well with many of us." Again, Chiquita's officials declined to comment regarding foreign companies owned or controlled by Chiquita. Plans revealed The web of Chiquitas's international trusts is detailed in scores of internal company records from high-level sources within Chiquita. Those sources cooperated with the newspaper on a confidential basis. Included in the records are copies of trust documents; legal memos, reports and opinions; lists of Chiquita's hand-picked shareholders; letters and memos from officials of companies that set up the trusts in such places as Liechtenstein and the Channel Islands; international loan and finance information; company financial and product flow charts. Based on this information, conversations with sources inside and outside the company and taped copies of internal Chiquita telephone voice-mail messages, the Enquirer has documented this story and others in this package. Here's what the newspaper has learned regarding the trusts. With the breakup of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the company wanted to restructure and expand its holdings so it could grow more bananas for what it hoped would be a new market in Eastern Europe, according to an April 12, 1989 internal report entitled "Honduras - 2,000 Hectares Project." Chiquita lawyers in Cincinnati arranged to have 30 Honduran trusts established in 1991 and 1992 to create new companies to buy land. The Honduran trusts were controlled by 20 overseas trusts set up at the same time. Trust documents show that these overseas trusts are controlled by Chiquita subsidiaries. A trust is defined as a legal entity in which property or power is entrusted for the benefit of another and is administered by a trustee. A March 4, 1992, letter from Herbert Smith, a London firm hired to help set up the Chiquita trusts, described how and why the trust structure was being created. "We have been instructed in connection with the establishment of 30 independent trusts in the Channel Islands by Chiquita International Limited," the letter stated. "Each trust forms part of a structure which will ultimately acquire and hold land in Honduras. It is intended that each trust will establish a trust arrangement with a bank in Honduras to which funds will be transferred. The Honduran Trust will acquire shares in a Honduran company which already owns or will own land in Honduras up to 250 hectares. "We understand that the reason behind structuring the ownership of land in Honduras in this way is to comply with the restrictions on the ownership of land imposed by Honduran law as to the nationality of the owner as well as to the amount of land which may be owned. "For the record, we wish to confirm our understanding that (we) are not expected to advise and are not being relied on for any advice with regard to the legality or the efficacy of the structures outlined above with regard to Honduran law. We understand that legal advice has already been obtained in Honduras on the basis of which Chiquita International Limited is prepared to proceed with these arrangements," the letter stated. The trusts are set up so Chiquita officials control decisions regarding those companies. Under the trust structure, Chiquita reaps the income and other benefits from the front companies. Further, each trust specified that another layer of trusts in Honduras would be set up with Honduran banks into which funds would be transferred, according to Chiquita's trust documents obtained by the Enquirer. Those banks are the trustees of the Honduran trusts. The trust trail An example of how the trusts were formed can be found in the King's Mills Trust, set up Nov. 27, 1991, on the island of Guernsey in the British Channel Islands. Think of the process as a stack of five building blocks - all connected, but with the lowest block (the land holder) three removed from the top block ( Chiquita) . The King's Mill Trust's purpose was "for the benefit of Chiquita International Limited," the Bermuda-based subsidiary, according to Chiquita's trust records. Tax and banking laws make the Channel Islands popular international tax and trust havens. At the same time the King's Mills Trust was established, a Honduran trust was set up. The Honduran trust was administered by a Honduran bank, "Banco Atlantida." Next, the Honduran trust became the major shareholder (99 percent) in a newly created company owning land in Honduras. The other 1 percent of that landholding company's shares was split among four Honduran citizens with ties to Chiquita or its subsidiaries. In that way, the new company showed Honduran owners of record. Using the building-block analogy, the landholding company is the bottom block (block No. 5). The Honduran trust (block No. 4) was controlled by the King's Mill Trust on Guernsey. King's Mill (block No. 3) was controlled by Chiquita subsidiaries (block No. 2): Chiquita International Limited and Chiquita International Trading Co. "And our Chiquita International Ltd., and Chiquita International Trading Co. people take their orders from right here in Cincinnati," (block No. 1) said a company lawyer involved in trust operations. The lawyer added: " Chiquita uses both an overseas trust and a Honduran trust so the company has an extra layer of protection from anyone discovering we ( Chiquita) are really the beneficial owner and controller of those supposedly independent banana companies in that country." Company records show that since 1991, Chiquita has used the same trust structure dozens of times to purchase thousands of hectares of land in Honduras. The purchases - using different trusts, shareholders, trustees and banks - hid Chiquita's control. "Using more than one bank in Honduras and more than one country to establish the offshore trusts further obfuscates the ownership of the farms," said a Sept. 20, 1991, letter from Chiquita finance executive Susan F. Chappano (now Susan Brester) to Gerald R. Kondritzer, Chiquita vice president and treasurer. In addition to new land purchases in the early 1990s, thousands of acres of Honduran farm land that Chiquita placed into the trust structure were part of banana farm companies Chiquita already secretly controlled through its " nominee form of ownership." In planning the trusts, Chiquita looked for loopholes in the laws of foreign countries, according to company sources. On April 23, 1991, Chiquita executives and lawyers met in Miami to review Honduran law and outline proposed corporate structures and the method of acquisition from a legal, tax, accounting and operational perspective, according to Chiquita records. A May 8, 1991 memo from Enrique A. Miguez of McDermott, Will & Emery ( Chiquita's outside law firm) outlined the meeting and listed company executives and lawyers who attended. The memo noted that Chiquita officials were told that Honduras' laws did not specifically address the issue of a foreign company being "beneficial owners of a (Honduran) company." Noting Honduras' national security law which prohibits foreign ownership of land near its borders, Mr. Miguez wrote: "The company's proposed acquisition, which we were advised is mostly within the 40 kilometers of the country's borders and located in the Lower Sula Valley, must be structured to comply with Honduras law. "The Agrarian Reform Law... limits the amount of land in certain areas of the country that anyone, whether foreign or Honduran, may own...In the Lower Sula Valley, the applicable limit is 250 hectares. Any excess above the maximum amount of land permitted is subject to expropriation by the National Agrarian Institute (INA), a government agency. In addition, any portion of the land, if the total aggregate exceeds the limitation, may be expropriated whether recently acquired or not." The Honduran law was passed to ensure that foreigners or wealthy Hondurans do not buy up the countryside. INA is supposed to investigate individuals and companies who acquire land to make sure they are abiding by the restrictions of the law. However, in his memo, Mr. Miguez wrote: "Because Honduran law is silent as to the beneficial owners of a company, it is the opinion of Honduran counsel that the INA would look no further than the Honduran bank acting as trustee with regard to ownership of the corporation." While the Honduran Commercial Code - laws dealing with businesses in that country - does not specifically address foreign companies using an international trust structure to avoid restrictions in the Agrarian Land Reform law, two articles of the code refer to trusts. Honduran Commercial Code Article 1035, translated from Spanish, states: " The trust implies the assignment of the rights or the transfer of the ownership of the goods in favor of the trustee." Article 1036 states: "With respect to third parties, the trustee will be considered as the owner of the rights or goods in trust." Honduras reaction After the Enquirer described Chiquita's trust structure and how thousands of hectares of land were purchased - including land within 40 kilometers of its borders - Benjamin Zapata, political affairs officer at the Hondurass Embassy in Washington, D.C., said that if there is "irrefutable evidence" of Chiquita or any company trying to "get around the (Honduran) law," it should be investigated. "If there were missteps done by an investor in Honduras, to go around or find a loophole in the law, I am certain that the investigator of the (Honduran) government - that we call like an attorney general - that (he) might be the proper entity to look at this and make the recommendation to the authorities," Mr. Zapata said. Honduran government leaders plan to review the Enquirer findings, he added. Honduran labor leaders ex-pressed outrage at Chiquita's land dealings. "This is fraud on the Honduran people and cannot be tolerated," said German Edgardo Zepeda. He is president of the Honduran labor organization Coordinadora de Sindicatos Bananeros de Honduras (COSIBAH). It coordinates the national unions that represent Honduran banana workers, including those that work for Chiquita. Iris Munguia, general secretary of COSIBAH, said "If Chiquita is the real, secret owners of these companies, they are violating the intent of our land and national securities laws and we will call for national investigations and strikes by our workers." Colombia Chiquita has used a similar trust structure since 1992 in Colombia, according to company sources and documents. A March 27, 1992, internal memo from Chiquita lawyer David Hills to company officials described how then existing and new farm companies in Colombia would be "restructured" using newly created trusts in Liechtenstein. "All companies (except Compania Frutera de Sevilla) will be 100% foreign- owned through combinations of Liechtenstein anstalts," the Hills memo said, referring to the trusts. The memo noted that existing companies controlled by Chiquita through "nominee shareholders" would have their shares transferred to one of the foreign trusts. "To avoid affiliation for labor union purposes, no two companies will have the same majority (trust) shareholder," Mr. Hills wrote. The names of Chiquita's then-newly created Colombian farm companies included El Porvenir S.A., La Finca S.A., Zungo, La Gurita S.A., El Retiro, and La Marfranca S.A., according to company records. Guatemala In Guatemala, Chiquita's secret banana operations are run by a farm management company subsidiary called COBIGUA, according to company records. For example, one Chiquita -controlled farm is called Chinook. COBIGUA manages Chinook's operations, as well as other farms. Chiquita officials repeatedly refused to answer Enquirer questions about whether the company owns COBIGUA. However, in an Oct. 11, 1997 voice-mail message by Chiquita lawyer David Hills to another Chiquita lawyer, Joel Raymer, Mr. Hills said: "Joel, one of the issues that's come up in this Enquirer story is they are asking for what Chiquita's position is on the stalled labor negotiations in Guatemala at our company-owned subsidiary COBIGUA. "Our strategy is to answer that, first of all, that COBIGUA is not our subsidiary, it's just one of our (independent) associate producers - wink, wink - because we have to take that position publicly. We cannot possibly admit that COBIGUA is our subsidiary." Ecuador Chiquita also used the trust structure to set up supposedly independent banana farm companies in Ecuador. A March 1992 internal company report reveals that Chiquita wanted to hide its control of those companies. Written by Chiquita financial analyst Paul M. White, the report described the company's rationale for restructuring its Ecuadoran operations and the company officials' belief that it complied with Ecuadoran law. "CBI ( Chiquita Brands International) prefers that some of its Ecuadoran operations remain anonymous in order to facilitate relationships with unions, governments and suppliers. By giving the perception of Cartonera Andina being independent, for example, CBI is able to reduce costs, and maintain improved relationships with the above groups. "Union negotiations. By having more companies, and thus more unions, CBI is able to reduce its exposure to strikes and increase its bargaining position," the White report stated. A Feb. 28, 1992, internal memo from Chiquita lawyer David Hills to company officials also described how the company's Ecuadorean operations would be restructured under foreign trusts in Liechtenstein, in part, to help prevent labor unions from organizing on farms run by the newly created companies. "To avoid affiliation for labor union purposes, no two companies will have the same majority (trust) shareholder," the Hills Ecuadoran memo said. "The service and export companies will not have shareholders in common with each other or with the farmcos (farm companies)." The restructuring outlined in Mr.Hills' memo never became fully operational because there was a glut of bananas in the European market and prices plummeted in 1992, forcing the banana company to halt its expansion plans in that country at that time, according to company sources. Chiquita's secret international trust structure " Chiquita International Limited (CIL) The new managed farms are being set up as a trust under CIL because they are easier to setup and manage and provide greater confidentiality than the nominee structure. Under the Honduran law, shares given in trust to a Honduran bank are considered owned by the bank. There is no need to have and keep track of 5 Hounduran nominees." "All companies (except Compania Frutera de Sevilla, "CFS") will be 100% foreign-owned through combinations of Liechtenstein Anstalts." "Using more than one bank in Honduras and more than one country to establish the offshore trusts further obfuscates the ownership of the farms." Chiquita trust structure Block by block 1. Chiquita Brands International Inc. Company officials decide to create an international trust structure to allow them to acquire and control additional land in Honduras. 2. Chiquita International Ltd. - Chiquita International Trading Co. The Chiquita subsidiaries selected by company officials to control decisions of overseas trusts. 3. Liechtenstein - Channel Islands trusts Overseas trusts, such as King's Mill, created for the benefit of Chiquita subsidiaries to control decisions of Honduran trusts. 4. Honduran trusts With Honduran banks as trustees, these trusts become the major shareholders of newly created farm companies. 5. Honduran farms companies These companies acquire Honduran farm land for Chiquita. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; "At first we had thought it could be the solvent that people were smelling, but approximately 16 to 17 samples were taken outside of the plant for chlorpyrifos and 15 of them turned up positive in fairly high quantities." - Roger Theodoredis, Chiquita executive assigned to investigate the Polymer Plastipak problems; Smokestack emits toxins; 'We cry for our children' Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: MIKE GALLAGHER AND CAMERON MCWHIRTER --------------------------------------------------------------------- A Chiquita subsidiary is exposing more than 500 men, women and children of Barrio Paris to a toxic chemical that the company knows is spewing from a San Jose factory smokestack in high quantities, internal company records reveal. Chiquita officials in Cincinnati have been aware of the problem for several months, but their efforts to solve it have been unsuccessful, according to company sources and internal voice-mail messages provided the Enquirer by a high-level company source. The plant manufactures plastic bags impregnated with a pesticide called chlorpyrifos. The bags are used to cover bananas ripening on plants to protect them from insects. Community leaders and neighbors in Barrio Paris have complained to the national health ministry that fumes have caused residents - including children and pregnant women - to suffer chronic respiratory problems, blistered skin and other serious ailments. The U.S. EPA classifies chlorpyrifos as a highly-toxic pesticide that is dangerous to humans if inhaled or if it comes into contact with skin for a protracted period of time. According to the EPA, universities and chemical manufacturers, chlorpyrifos can cause delayed nerve damage, multiple sclerosis, loss of use of limbs, lung congestion, paralysis, convulsions, dizziness, mental disorders, blurred vision, chest pain, loss of reflexes and death. For years plant officials of the Chiquita subsidiary, Polymer Plastipak, have denied those claims to Costa Rican health officials, according to more than a dozen letters from company officials and lawyers sent to the Ministry of Health since 1992. The company has conceded only that the plant emits a "bad odor." Despite company claims that the fumes are harmless, a 1997 Costa Rican national laboratory report asserted that the company repeatedly failed to conduct government-mandated air tests to determine whether the plant is discharging the pesticide into the atmosphere and causing health problems for nearby residents. The report, translated for the Enquirer, also stated that the company's use of chlorpyrifos results in "high risk for ... health of the neighbors." "It is proven that extended exposure to this pesticide (especially children and pregnant women)produces health problems to people," the report said. The March 20, 1997, report was prepared by Defensoria de Los Habitantes, a Costa Rican congressional agency created to ensure that other government departments protect citizens on health, environmental, and other issues. Testing at the plant, conducted by Chiquita after the Enquirer began questioning company officials about the problem, revealed high quantities of chlorpyrifos were being spewed into the air through the plant's smokestack. The pesticide also is being released inside the plant and into the atmosphere where the bags are cut and separated, the Enquirer has learned. In an Oct. 3, 1997 voice-mail message to Robert Olson, Chiquita's chief counsel in Cincinnati, Roger Theodoredis, a company executive in Cincinnati assigned to investigate the Polymer problems, confirmed that Polymer Plastipak was emitting chlorpyrifos into the atmosphere in "high quantities." "At first we had thought it could be the solvent that people were smelling, but approximately 16 to 17 samples were taken outside of the plant for chlorpyrifos and 15 of them turned up positive in fairly high quantities," Mr. Theodoredis said in the message. "I wanted to alert you to that. There appear to be two sources of chlorpyrifos getting out into the atmosphere. One is the smokestack which is part of the process. That is when the bags are formed in the extrusion process; heated exhaust air goes up the stack and apparently there is chlorpyrifos going up the stack. "The second, unexpected source of chlorpyrifos is taking place in another room of the factory in which the bags are cut. That cutting of the bags is causing chlorpyrifos to be emitted," he added. A tape recording of the voice-mail message was provided to the Enquirer by a company source who asked not to be identified because of fear of retribution. In the message, Mr. Theodoredis also told Mr. Olson of the long-standing problems between Polymer Plastipak and the Costa Rican Ministry of Health over the toxic fumes issue. "There is a history of contention between the plant and the Ministry of Health. On August 8th, for example, the Ministry of Health shut down the Polymer (Plastipak) plant for about 12 hours due to the smell issue. Currently the plant is working under a temporary suspension of that shutdown order." Chiquita denied to the Enquirer that there is any threat to nearby residents. In a statement issued through its lawyers, Chiquita made no reference to any concerns about chlorpyrifos levels it or the government may have had about Polymer: "Investigation by Chiquita and independent consultants (hired by the company) confirms that the Plastipak plant does not pose a threat to the surrounding community. Any concentrations of chlorpyrifos measured at the surrounding residences fall well within the Average Acceptable Ambient Air Concentrations used in the United States." Chiquita did not respond to Enquirer requests to provide the newspaper with copies of its complete Polymer test results. Additionally, the letter said: "Any concentrations of pesticides within the plant pose no health threat to workers." Chiquita officials refused to provide the Enquirer with any written test results, reports or findings of its independent consultants who performed the tests on the plant's emissions. And according to Defensoria and Health Ministry officials, neither Chiquita nor its Plastipak company executives have submitted the written findings of its consultants' plant emission testings to them for review. Residents of Barrio Paris described for the Enquirer health problems they attribute to the Polymer Plastipak plant and their fears for their children's health. "We have a very huge problem here," Blanca Brenes Morales, 62, president of the Barrio Paris Neighborhood Association, said through a translator. "They (Polymer) use a chemical that goes right up into the air and we breathe it. All of us knew when we moved here that we would live in an industrial area, but no one, not even the government, knew or agreed that they could poison us with their chemicals." Ms. Brenes said that whenever the fumes become heavy in the air, she calls Polymer plant officials. "They always tell me they are just changing their filters," she said. She said most of her fears center around the children in the neighborhood. "We don't really know how this poison will affect us in the future. We cry for our children." Ms. Brenes said she and many other residents of Barrio Paris are too poor to leave their homes and wouldn't be able to find comparable, affordable housing elsewhere. Criticisms in Defensoria's report were not only aimed only at Polymer Plastipak. Defensoria repeatedly criticized offices of the Costa Rican government's own Health Ministry for failing to conduct needed blood tests of the Barrio Paris residents to monitor the harmful effects of the chlorpyrifos. In 1993 the Health Ministry did take blood samples from the residents after repeated complaints that fumes from the Polymer Plastipak plant were making people ill. But necessary follow-up tests to confirm the levels of pesticide in the residents' bloodstreams never were taken because health ministry officials cited a lack of manpower, according to the Defensoria report. Polymer Plastipak officials in Costa Rica declined requests for interviews from Enquirer reporters. Since the 12-hour shutdown in August, Polymer and Chiquita officials have failed to provide the Health Ministry any documented proof of "substantive changes to either the mixture or its filtration system that would prevent further harm to the company's own workers or the residents who live near there," said Rodrigo Alberto Carazo, a director in Defensoria. Mr. Carazo said that Polymer officials have for years not only denied toxic fumes were affecting workers at the plant or nearby residents, but also that the "non-harmful smell problem had not been contained because of ongoing problems with a plant filtration system." "That has been their excuse for many, many years," said Mr. Carazo. "We've been receiving letters like that since at least 1993 or 1994." Plastipak's letters hold little sway with Gerardo Campos Cartin, 48, who cites his own doctor's findings that he has been contaminated by chlorpyrifos. Chiquita's plant in Barrio Paris is the only company in that section of the city using chlorpyrifos, according to Health Ministry records. Walking out to a children's playground located directly behind the Polymer plant, Mr. Campos talked of a respiratory disease he said his doctor has linked to the plant's poisonous fumes. "It is so bad that many times I cannot breathe without help (from drugs or a respirator)", Mr. Campos said through a translator. "When the factory is running and the smokestack belches out those fumes, I must run inside my house and hide under my bed. If I smell (the fumes) at all I begin choking. My skin also turns red with rashes and I become so sick I sometimes want to die." But Mr. Campos said his greatest fear is for Barrio Paris' children. "Look at this playground right here by the plant," he said, pointing to the swing set, teeter-totter, climbing bars and small basketball court. "All the children play here. They have no place else to go." In another development, the Enquirer also has learned from company sources that Chiquita plans to sell its Polymer operations. When asked through its attorneys about the plans, Chiquita officials did not respond. In internal company voice-mail messages obtained by the Enquirer from a high-level company source, several Chiquita executives and lawyers discuss plans to sell its Polymer operations, including the Plastipak plant in Costa Rica. "We don't really know how this poison will affect us in the future." - Blanca Brenes Morales, 62 (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; "The one thing that (the Enquirer) asked me that I hedged on was how much did Chiquita pay you, CI (Conservation International), to do this study. I said I'll have to check, even though I actually know... I don't feel that it's really any of his (the reporter's) business." -- James Nations, Conservation International; Some pesticides highly toxic Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita uses products with low EPA toxicity classification for mammalian and aquatic life," the company stated to the Enquirer through its attorneys. However, the Enquirer found numerous examples on Chiquita's own list of approved pesticides of products that have been designated by U.S. government agencies as possibly cancerous to humans, or toxic to animals or fish. Those pesticides, all used by Chiquita and its subsidiaries in aerial spraying in Latin America, include: Propiconazole, sold as Tilt: Propiconazole has been classified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a "possible human carcinogen." According to published documents by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, the pesticide "can cause skin irritation and substantial, but temporary, eye irritation. The petroleum solvent in some formulations can cause a chemical pneumonitis (lung complications) if breathed into the lungs. Prolonged inhalation of vapors may irritate throat and nasal passages and cause central nervous system effects, which can include headache, dizziness, confusion, and nausea. If swallowed, abdominal pain, nausea, gastritis, breathing difficulty, or diarrhea can occur." The department recommends workers exposed to the chemical wash hands "before eating, drinking, chewing gum, using tobacco or using the toilet. Do not get in eyes, on skin, or on clothing. To avoid breathing vapor or spray mist, wear a NIOSH(National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health)-approved organic cartridge respirator" Azoxystrobin, sold as Bankit: The EPA has ruled this new product is "highly toxic to freshwater fish and invertebrates, highly toxic to estuarine - marine fish, and very highly toxic to estuarine - marine invertebrates." The product labels, observed in Chiquita storage facilities in southeastern Costa Rica, read clearly "MARINE POLLUTANT" and bear a symbol of a fish with an "X" through it. Benomyl, sold as Benlate: This pesticide, classified by the EPA as possibly cancer-causing for humans, has been in wide use in the United States and around the world for years. But the pesticide has come under increasing attack from people who claim it has harmed them. In 1989 and 1991, manufacturer E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, known as DuPont, recalled a dry version of the pesticide, Benlate 50 DF, after American farmers reported severe crop damage after using the product. The company faced several lawsuits in Texas, Hawaii, Florida and other states. In 1996, a Florida jury awarded $4 million to John Castillo, a boy born with no eyes. His mother, while pregnant with him, was accidentally drenched in the pesticide on a Florida farm. The jury found both DuPont and the farm negligent. That farm was not connected to Chiquita and did not grow bananas. Chiquita uses the wet, soluble version of the pesticide. Thiophanate-Methyl, sold as Topsin: The U.S. Department of Agriculture found the pesticide to be moderately to highly toxic for various types of fish. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has found that the pesticide is hazardous to 10 endangered species in the United States. The pesticide was listed as a possible carcinogen for humans, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. It was also found to damage the thyroid gland. The department has ruled that people not wearing protective equipment cannot return to a field sprayed with thiophanate-methyl for at least 12 hours. Tridemorph, sold as Calixin: Tridemorph is a hazard to fish, according to the EPA. Mancozeb, sold as Dithane: Mancozeb is "moderately to highly toxic to fish and aquatic invertebrate animals," according to the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The department recommends "Do not apply when weather conditions favor drift (wind carrying pesticides away) from treated areas. Do not apply in a way that will contact workers or other persons, either directly or through drift. Drift and runoff may be hazardous to aquatic organisms in neighboring areas." The department recommends that workers not enter treated areas for 24 hours after spraying. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; "They don't want us doing any research. For example, water pollution. It is better (for a company) to suspect that the water is polluted than to know that the water is polluted." - Professor Luisa Castillo, Costa Rica's National University Pesticide Program; Industry resists curbs, but bananas safe Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- Commercial banana growers like Chiquita use numerous pesticides to combat fungus, insects and other pests that could destroy the fruit. And they use those pesticides often. The reason is simple. Bananas sold in the United States or Europe are almost all one type: the Gran Cavendish, the large banana that consumers have grown to expect. On miles of plantations from Guatemala in Central America to Ecuador thousands of miles to the south, the fruit is genetically identical. Because the tropical plants are planted in close proximity and come from the same genetic source - a system known as "monoculture" farming - an outbreak of pests, fungi or disease can quickly wipe out a plantation. It would be as if scientists cloned one person who was likely to get a disease. If that person got the disease, soon all of the clones would catch it as well, unless they were given massive amounts of medicine. In the case of bananas, you use pesticides. "You're creating an extremely artificial situation. You're creating a situation that is ripe for some kind of a pest or fungal problem to sweep your plantation," said Dr. Thomas Lacher, Jr., an associate professor at Texas A&M's Department Wildlife and Fisheries Sciences and co-author of a recent article on risks to the environment by the banana industry. He said the multinational companies, including Chiquita, use pesticides now that are dangerous and toxic or "pretty hot" when applied. But these pesticides don't just go on the plants. Applied by air or by workers with backpack sprayers, pesticides drift through the air. They get into the soil and onto workers, villagers and animals. Scientists and environmentalists stress that the industry's pesticide problem is not endangering the consumer, but endangering the workers and villagers where the bananas are grown. "What makes you ill or can even kill you as a worker may not affect you as a consumer," according to Colorado State University Professor Douglas Murray, author of Cultivating Crisis: The Human Cost of Pesticides in Latin America. Over the decades, the banana industry has faced a series of problems related to the use of pesticides. One of the most highly publicized cases involved Dibromochloropropane, known by the acronym DBCP, which was widely used in the 1970s to combat tiny parasitic worms that attack the roots of the banana plant. DBCP, through improper application and toxicity, allegedly caused sterility in male workers, according to lawsuits filed in U.S. courts. By 1997, more than 24,000 banana workers, mostly in Costa Rica and many of them employees of Chiquita or its subsidiaries, signed up for class action law suits against the manufacturer, Dow Chemical, and users of the pesticide, including Chiquita. The lawsuits stated that many men had become sterile and medical evidence linked their sterility to the pesticide. The companies, including Chiquita, which said it used the chemical only in the early to mid-1970s, have fought efforts to get the case tried in a U.S. jurisdiction. In June, Dow Chemical offered $22 million in a global settlement - which worked out to a few hundred dollars per worker. "We continue to dispute our liability," Dow Chemical spokesman Dan Fellner told the Enquirer. "Unfortunately, many of the users and purchasers of DBCP did not read the labels or follow the instructions." The plaintiffs accepted the offer from Dow, but cases against the banana companies are pending. "If we ever get in a courtroom, we'll kill them," said one of the plaintiff attorneys, Charles Siegal of Dallas. In a statement issued through its attorneys, Chiquita did not mention litigation but stated it stopped using DBCP in 1977, "two years before the EPA banned DBCP in 1979." EPA records show it ordered DBCP phased out for use in the United States in 1977. The product was banned in Costa Rica in 1978. The EPA ordered a complete ban on the product in 1979, meaning any product that tests positive for even a trace of the pesticide may not be brought into the United States. As consumer consciousness about pesticide use increased over the years, the banana industry changed pesticides when problems were brought to the public's attention in North America and Europe. For example, in 1990, the pesticide Aldicarb was banned by the EPA after levels above EPA safety guidelines were found in potatoes being brought to market. Later, excess levels were found by FDA checks of some bananas coming to American ports. Quickly, the pesticide was dropped by the entire banana industry. Professor Luisa Castillo, head of the National University's Pesticide Program in Costa Rica, said she and other scientists had complained about Aldicarb to banana growers for years, with little result. Chiquita stated that it used the pesticide for only one year. "Aldicarb was very popular, but it was causing a very high number of pesticide poisonings to workers, and it was also causing fish kills and other problems here," she said. "We had already pointed out this problem with Aldicarb, but nothing had been done. It was only in the moment that the residue appeared in the fruit that immediately they (growers) stopped using Aldicarb." Industry supporters said that banana companies don't misuse pesticides. "Pesticides are very expensive, so you only use them if you absolutely have to," said Robert Moore, president of the International Banana Association (IBA), a Washington D.C.-based group working for the interests of the American banana industry. Since the Aldicarb scare, the banana industry has met safety standards for U.S. Food and Drug Administration spot checks at the ports. According to FDA reports, administration tests from 1992 to 1994 showed traces of pesticides in the bananas sampled but rarely in unsafe amounts. The FDA checks only a fraction of the bananas brought into the United States. In 1996, it conducted tests on fewer than 800 shipments. During the same period, tens of thousands of shipments brought more than 22.3 billion bananas into the country, according to the IBA. Polly Hoppin, director of agricultural pollution prevention at the World Wildlife Fund and an expert on pesticides said the FDA checks don't reveal much about what is going on at the plantations. Professor Scott Witter at Michigan State University's Institute of International Agriculture said that most pesticides applied these days may show up in FDA banana sampling, but virtually always within safe amounts for consumers. But for the thousands of people working on or living near the banana plantations, pesticides threaten their health. "The people who tend to take it on the nose are the Costa Ricans or the Hondurans or the Ecuadoreans who work on the plantations when they are doing the spraying," he said. "They're in the field. Their water supplies get contaminated. Their kids play in the dirt that's contaminated that day. I've yet to witness a really wonderful program where they say, OK, we're spraying today, everybody needs to stay inside." Chiquita, through its lawyers, has stated that "There is no soil contamination problem on Chiquita farms." Scientists complain that figuring out how exactly pesticides are affecting people and the environment on banana plantations is extremely difficult, because gathering any hard data is constantly resisted by banana companies. "They don't want us doing any research," said Professor Castillo at the Pesticide Program. "For example, water pollution. It is better (for a company) to suspect that the water is polluted than to know that the water is polluted." The large banana companies resist independent scientific studies on their plantations, because they don't want the public to know, she contended. "They are always saying that hard data can affect them in the international market," Professor Castillo said. "So if it is known that there are pollution and health problems, then people won't want to buy the product. From our point of view, we feel we have to know the situation in order to change it and that we hope that the more educated consumer will change things." Professor Lacher at Texas A&M said he and his co-authors on his recent paper about agrochemicals in the banana industry tried to get the multinational companies to cooperate, but could not get anyone to talk with them. "We didn't publish the industry perspective, but you can't get access to industry information," said Mr. Lacher. "If everything is proprietary, there's nothing we can do about it." Mr. Lacher said the industry is defensive on the pesticide issue. "Nobody's saying you shouldn't grow bananas," he said. "Nobody's saying you shouldn't apply chemicals. But what you need to do is look at what the major sources of risks are." Scientists aren't the only ones feeling a cold shoulder. Several years ago, the Intergovernmental Group on Bananas of the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization set up a special committee called the Banana Improvement Project. In a 1995 report, project officials stated that they hoped the major companies would provide the project with money and technical assistance to tackle difficult problems facing banana production, including Black Sigatoka - the destructive, airborne disease that threatens the entire banana industry and has led major companies to increase aerial spraying on their farms. At the Intergovernmental group's meeting in Rome last May, the Banana Improvement Project wrote its own epitaph in the meeting report. "The lack of financial support from the banana industry is surprising and extremely disappointing," the report read. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; 'Better banana' program under attack Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite Chiquita's promotion of the ECO-OK - "Better Banana" certification, the program has come under increasing attack for what has been perceived by some environmentalists and scientists as a sell-out to corporate interests. Chiquita quickly became a major force in the program, as the only major banana producer to participate. While the Rainforest Alliance has continued to try and present the program as open to everyone, Chiquita's participation overshadows all others, according to scientists, environmentalists and former employees of Chiquita. In material and advertisements in the United States and Europe, Chiquita has been quick to use its Rainforest Alliance certification to link its products to environmental safety. Of the 81 farms certified on the program worldwide by January 1998, 74 - 91 percent - were directly owned Chiquita subsidiaries. Connie Smith, who was Chiquita's Central American environmental coordinator before leaving her post in 1996, said the certification program ran into problems because banana companies were too competitive to cooperate. Once Chiquita began to dominate the program, the two other large companies, Dole and Del Monte, lost interest in the idea. "It all started out on good intentions," said Ms. Smith, who lives with her family in San Jose, Costa Rica. "It was going to be an industry-wide voluntary program....But (the banana multinationals) are big competitors....The ECO-OK became an issue of competition- If we get the certification and they don't that will differentiate (our bananas).' That should never have happened." The program was orginally called "ECO-O.K.," but the alliance later changed the name to "Better Banana." Ms. Smith said the connection today between Chiquita and the Rainforest Alliance "does have a tendency to make people wonder" about the program's validity. She said "the program needs to be re- evaluated." Eric Holst, coordinator of the Rainforest Alliance's "Better Banana" program in New York, said the alliance receives no donations from Chiquita, but it does accept corporate donations from other companies that it is not certifying. It does charge a fee for certification. The money is paid directly to its Costa Rican partner, Fundacion Ambio, the group that performs the inspections on Chiquita subsidiary farms. Mr. Holst said Fundacion Ambio conducts scheduled inspections on farms once a year in Costa Rica and Panama. Mr. Holst said the group reserves the right to conduct spot checks and conducts between one and 10 a year. No certified plantation ever has had its certification revoked for violations. Violations are usually not written up and are not made public, Mr. Holst said. If inspectors find violations, plantation managers are notified and asked to correct the problem. Specific information about the inspections or any violations is proprietary and not available to the public, Mr. Holst said. This fiscal year, Fundacion Ambio has a budget of $312,000, according to Mr. Holst. About 25 percent of that budget comes from Chiquita's fee payments, he said. Mr. Holst said all of Chiquita's subsidiary farms in Costa Rica are certified under the Rainforest Alliance's program. Those certifications do not include many associate farms that sell fruit to Chiquita. In a statement issued through its attorneys, Chiquita stated that as contracts are renewed, it is asking associate farms to apply for certification with the alliance. About half of Chiquita's subsidiary plantations in Panama are certified. Thirteen Chiquita subsidiary farms in Colombia have also been certified. None of Chiquita's subsidiary farms, or the farms of its associate growers, in Honduras, Guatemala or Ecuador are certified yet, because the program was first tested in Costa Rica. Chiquita has publicly committed to bringing all of its plantations into the "Better Banana" program by 1999. Rainforest Alliance officials said they are lining up local environmental groups in those countries to begin inspections. In 1996, Chiquita paid the Washington-based environmental group Conservation International to send a team of eight environmental experts to visit its certified farms in Costa Rica and Panama. In response to questions by the Enquirer, Conservation International issued a two-page letter to Chiquita, which was then forwarded to the Enquirer. It declared Chiquita's environmental efforts as "an innovative system that looks for environmental improvements in the effects of monocultures (single-crop farms), serves as a guide for the establishment of environmental measures, and promotes gradual changes in land use practices. This program should be continued and supported for its goals." James Nations, vice president of Mexico and Central America Programs for Conservation International who led the Chiquita- commissioned study, told the Enquirer that he found the certification "very positive" and "a very above-board system." After the discussion with the Enquirer, Mr. Nations called Magnes Welsh, Chiquita's director of investor relations, according to Nov. 13 tape-recorded voice mail-message provided to the Enquirer through a company source. He told Ms. Welsh that "I gave (the reporter) a very positive story." "The one thing that (the Enquirer) asked me that I hedged on was how much did Chiquita pay you, CI, to do this study," Mr. Nations told Ms. Welsh. "I said I'll have to check, even though I actually know. Now, I want to know from you, and also I'm going to ask people here, Pete and Karen (CI staffers), what they think about this idea of actually releasing that information. Because I don't feel that it's really any of his (the reporter's) business. So let me know what you think about that." Mr. Nations did not return follow-up calls from the Enquirer. Chiquita does support other environmental work outside of the "Better Banana" program. For example, the company is funding the nonprofit organization Amigos de Las Aves (Friends of the Birds), a group run by two expatriate Americans who work to raise macaws in captivity and then release them into the wild. The group stated in an e-mail response to the Enquirer that it received about $20,000 so far from Chiquita, as well as weekly free bananas to feed their birds. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; Death on farm shows danger Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- Pesticides can kill more than pests. Take Greddy Mauricio Valerin Bustos, a worker on Plantation 96, a farm in Costa Rica owned by Chiquita's subsidiary, the Chiriqui Land Company. On the morning of Nov. 13, 1997, the 18-year-old had been working since 5 a.m. collecting "piola," the thin rope used to support the banana plants. At about 7:30 a.m., according to the police, he was found writhing on the ground, choking and vomiting up a white substance. He was dead by 9:17 a.m. Police investigators interviewed one of the co-workers who brought his body to the medical clinic. "He was working in an area called Los 50s, that had been sprayed with the agrochemical Counter (the brand name for the pesticide terbufos, an organ-ophosphate) three days ago," Miguel Herra Miranda told police, according to a translation of the investigation report. "He (Mr. Valerin) didn't have any experience in this kind of job and he wasn't using any protective gear like gloves and mask either." The autopsy report, obtained by the Enquirer, determined that Mr. Valerin died from intoxication from organophosphates, which caused internal bleeding and brain damage. Chiquita, in a statement through its lawyers, said the company acknowledged that the Costa Rican government coroner declared the cause of death to be organophosphate poisoning. The company also stated it operated the farm safely and the death was "an isolated incident." "Although Chiquita has attempted to understand the details surrounding Mr. Valerin's collapse, Chiquita is unable to explain (and will not speculate) how Mr. Valerin might have died," Chiquita stated. Under an agreement with the New York-based environmental group the Rainforest Alliance, Plantation 96 is certified under the "Better Banana" program to meet certain environmental and worker safety guidelines. But often problems can be hard to detect because the program requires inspectors visit plantations only once a year, with possible spot checks afterward, said Eric Holst, New York coordinator of the "Better Banana" program. "That's one of the weaknesses of certification. You can't be there every day," Mr. Holst said. As a rule, Chiquita and its subsidiaries do not provide protective gear for workers unless those workers are directly involved in the application or storage of pesticides. The vast majority receive no protective clothing, though they are exposed to pesticides in their work on the plantations. Carl Smith, publications director and an expert on pesticide exports at the Foundation for Advancements in Science and Education (FASE) in Los Angeles, said the use of many pesticides like terbufos are legal in the United States but only under strict safety regulations. When these chemicals are exported to Central America, where worker safety and environmental laws are less stringent, the result can be dangerous for the workers and the environment. "When you look at conditions of use in areas like Central America, there are a lot of compounds that are awful dangerous," he said. "It's one thing if a guy is wearing a full moon suit with a respirator and gloves. It's another thing if teenagers are walking around the stuff with no shirt." Nearby Plantation 96 is Plantation O3, a farm that has an exclusive contract to sell bananas to Chiquita. Like other farms in the area, the farm, owned by Proyecto Agroindustrial de Sixaola, S.A, (PAIS), ships bananas with Chiquita labels and in Chiquita boxes. The plantation grows bananas only for Chiquita and to contractual specifications set by Chiquita. In a statement issued through its attorneys, Chiquita said it was not responsible for anything that happened on the farm, but said it does exert pressure in its contracts to monitor safety and environmental standards. "Chiquita - although it is not in any way required to do so - is insisting that independent growers adopt Chiquita's own strict environmental standards and practices if they want to renew contractual relations with the company," the company stated. On the farm, Enquirer reporters saw a work team applying terbufos, a nematicide classified as extremely hazardous to humans by the World Health Organization. Terbufos is under "restricted use" in the United States by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Nematicides are pesticides used to kill nematodes, tiny worm parasites that can destroy a crop's roots. According to EPA guidelines, once the pesticide is put on the ground, no one should be allowed in the area for at least 24 hours unless wearing protective clothing and a respirator. Children playing But with the air thick with the heavy smell of pesticides, the Enquirer team observed children from the nearby village playing in the area amid open bags of terbufos and plants just treated with the pesticide. No warning signs were posted and no workers tried to stop the children from playing in the area or passing through. The Enquirer saw signs with a warning in Spanish, "DANGER, nematicide application in this area," leaning against the wall of a packing plant about a mile away. When asked about Plantation 03, and PAIS, Chiquita issued a statement through its attorneys declaring "The Pais farm is owned and operated by a Costa Rican quasi-governmental institution. Chiquita does not own or operate the farm. What the Enquirer says it observed at Pais should not have happened." The company stated that it has since renegotiated its contract with the owners of PAIS and requires the company to adhere to Chiquita standard operating procedures regarding environmental safety. Enquirer reporters also observed pesticide workers at Finca O3 taking off their masks because of the stifling heat. Mr. Smith of FASE said the protective clothing is a fundamental problem in tropical agricultural, which neither "Better Banana" nor any other program has solved. He said the limited safety equipment that has been created for these materials is often heavy rubber, suitable for northern, colder climates. In the tropics, a mask, rubber gloves, a rubber apron, rubber boots, long pants and a sweatshirt make for incredibly uncomfortable work days on a sweltering plantation. Such heavy clothing itself could be unsafe because of the danger of heat exhaustion, Mr. Smith said. "The equipment doesn't even exist that is suitable for tropical climates," he said. Even workers who wear protective clothing properly are not safe, workers told the Enquirer. On Cocobola plantation, owned by one of Chiquita's Costa Rican subsidiaries - Compania Bananera Atlantica Ltda. (COBAL) - in northeast Costa Rica, pesticide worker Emilio Colero, 41, told Enquirer reporters that he was concerned about his health. He was issued protective clothing when he applied the ground pesticides. But he said through a translator that "when I bend over, some of the herbicide liquid gets on my neck. I get a rash every time until I take a shower." Mr. Colero said his wife is constantly concerned about him, but he works in pesticides because the pay is better than other field jobs. He makes 680 Costa Rican colones per hectare, and sprays about three or four hectares a day. That salary is about $15 a day. Through its attorneys, the company issued a written statement that Chiquita strictly adheres to safety recommendations of the pesticides that it uses. The company said also that it has reduced its use of nematicides like terbufos by more than 50 percent since 1995, "demonstrating its continuing commitment to minimizing the environmental impact of its farming operations." New chemicals applied Another problem is at Chiquita packing plants and those of affiliates, where the bananas are brought to be boxed before shipment. In these processing centers, the bananas are washed of chemicals that have been applied in the fields. After this washing process, the bananas then are sprayed with new chemicals, either thiabendazole or imazalil or both, to keep the fruit from rotting. As Chiquita boxes state clearly, "Thiabendazole and - or Imazalil applied to fruit to preserve quality in transit." Workers then pick up these pesticide-covered bananas, usually with their bare hands, and place them in boxes for shipment. Scientists, union officials and workers told reporters of rashes on the arms of women in the packing houses. Chemical runoff from washed bananas and newly applied pesticides also flows into water passing through plant operations and back into irrigation canals. Those canals then flow into nearby rivers. Chiquita stated through its attorneys that it has conducted comprehensive tests of water running off its farms and "Chiquita never has detected a level of pesticides that posed any threat to the environment or people." The Enquirer visited packing plants on certified plantations of Chiquita's subsidiaries in Costa Rica. Most did not have containment or treatment systems to remove chemicals from the water supply. Almost none of the workers had gloves. Thiabendazole is a fungicide that the EPA has determined is harmful to fish. According to the Pesticide Users' Health and Safety Handbook, government laboratory studies have also pointed to the fungicide as a possible cause of anemia and a possible cancer-causing agent in mammals. Imazalil is classified as a moderately toxic compound by the Extensions Toxicology Network, a cooperative information group on pesticides set up by Cornell University and other universities and funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. According to a Network document, lab animals fed imazalil have suffered symptoms including "muscle incoordination, reduced arterial tension, tremors, and vomiting." Professor Luisa Castillo, who heads Costa Rica's National University Pesticide Program, said the two chemicals are a major concern for environmental scientists in Costa Rica. Scientists in her program have conducted studies of rivers in national parks downstream from banana plantations, some of which were operated by Chiquita. "We have found high levels of imazalil and thiabendazole in the water, and we have also found toxicity (by those two pesticides) toward aquatic organisms," Ms. Castillo said. Her program's studies have not pinpointed the specific source of this pollution. She said one of the key components of any sincere attempt to improve the environment would be to stop those chemicals from getting into the water supply. "I would immediately put water treatment plants in the packing plants and not allow that water to flow into the natural courses of water because it is quite polluted," Ms. Castillo said. In a statement issued through its lawyers, Chiquita stated that it has spent at least $3.3 million installing special chambers at its packing plants to apply thiabendazole or imazalil to the bananas, reducing the amount of these pesticides used and the amount to which workers are exposed. The company stated that it has installed these chambers on a number of its farms. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; Industry attacks report critical of farm growth Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- A report critical of banana farm expansion for causing environmental and social problems at the beginning of this decade was kept from the public for years by the Costa Rican environmental ministry - after the banana industry, including Chiquita, attacked the study. Now that the report has been released, banana plantation owners continue to criticize the internationally-respected group that wrote it. In the early 1990s, almost 100 square miles of Costa Rican grazing land and forests in the northeastern section of the country were bought by banana companies like Chiquita and turned into banana fields. According to Costa Rican government statistics, 70,740 acres were in banana production nationwide in 1990. By 1995, that number had jumped to 131,117.5 acres, an increase of more than 85 percent. A Catholic bishop near the region, labor leaders and conservationists publicly expressed concerns about the expansion's effect on the environment and the treatment of workers. In response, the Costa Rican ministry for environmental affairs commissioned a report on the banana industry from the Central American office of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1991. The IUCN, one of the oldest international conservation groups, runs conservation projects around the world and counts agencies of 74 governments as members, including the United States, Panama, Japan and the United Kingdom. The 129-page report - parts of which were leaked in 1993 - discussed various problems caused by an increase in banana cultivation. Deforestation One of the biggest problems cited was deforestation. The huge increase meant the loss of thousands of acres of cattle farms and more than 13 square miles of primary rain forest, according to the report. Another issue was that the increase in banana plantations led to a dramatic rise in pesticide use in an area permeated by rivers and creeks that flow into the Caribbean, according to the report. The new plantations also were located near many sensitive forest preserves and conservation areas. Environmentalists were concerned about pollution from pesticides causing fish kills and other environmental problems, the report said. The report also dealt with unemployment prompted by the expansion. While workers were brought in initially to build the plantations, many were fired afterward because it took fewer people to maintain the farms. As a result, many people moving to a remote area of the country found themselves unemployed. Goal was awareness The goal of the report was to raise awareness of these issues among government officials, the public and the banana industry leaders. "What we would like to see is a more environmentally and socially aware banana industry," Enrique Lahmann, regional director of the IUCN, said. But the public didn't get to see the report for years. When some draft findings were leaked, the banana companies declared open opposition and set up their own commission, Comision Ambiental Bananera, to coordinate the industry's response.A new administration came into office in 1996 and the report was released in early 1997. Asked if the government endorsed the report, the Costa Rican embassy in Washington D.C. sent the Enquirer an old press release from CORBANA, a state-owned banana company, condemning the report. Asked if that represented the government's position, the Costa Rican embassy referred all questions to MINAE, Costa Rica's environmental department. That agency did not respond to repeated phone calls, e- mails and fascimile transmissions. In its 1997 official statement on the final IUCN report, the commission reiterated its longstanding recommendation that "the (environmental) minister must not endorse the diagnostic report as an updated document" and suggested that it only be considered "an historical document" (translation). If the document was not considered updated, it could not be considered by the environmental ministry in its policy decisions as relevant to the banana industry today, the statement said. Mr. Lahmann said powerful American banana interests have operated in Costa Rica for more than 100 years, and their political influence was applied to hold the report for years. "There is no question that the banana industry has a lot of weight in national politics in Costa Rica," Mr. Lahmann said. Chiquita officials refused to be interviewed by the Enquirer about this project, including the IUCN report. Through attorneys the company released a statement that it never tried to keep the report from the public. The statement condemned the IUCN report as "unbalanced" and "not based on scientific method but, instead, solely on casual observation." The research team was comprised of 16 scientific and academic teams looking at different aspects of the expansion like pesticide use, agro-ecology, legal issues, social impact, refuse, economics and forestry. The "environmental diagnostic" included analysis of high- grade maps of the region as well as satellite photographs. Visited region The teams made numerous visits to the region to interview workers, conservation groups, medical personnel, local government officials, health ministry officials and environment ministry officials. The teams also held numerous talks with administrators from all the major multinational companies, including Chiquita's main Costa Rican subsidiary, Compania Bananera Atlantica Ltda. (COBAL). "I don't think that it is unscientific. Well-known professionals participated in the report," said the IUCN's Mr. Lahmann, who has a Ph.D. in oceanography from the University of Miami and who is an expert in wetlands pollution. Mr. Lahmann said that while the IUCN came under a lot of criticism from the banana companies, the report helped raise awareness of environmental issues in Costa Rica. "I wonder if that would have happened without this report," he said. Chiquita dismissed the IUCN as "a confederation of environmental interest groups." The IUCN is a federation of conservation groups and government agencies with several important U.S. institutions as official members. These members include the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Oceans, International Environment and Scientific Affairs, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service and the Nature Conservancy. Conservation International, which Chiquita itself described as a "highly respected independent environmental organization" when it paid the organization last year to critique the company's own environmental program, also is a member. Chiquita also said the IUCN would not endorse the report. Mr. Lahmann said preliminary drafts carried a label that the opinions expressed in the report were those of the consultants during discussion. Once the environment ministry officially released the report this year, it was endorsed publicly by the IUCN, according to Mr. Lahmann. Report suppressed While Chiquita stated that it had nothing to do with keeping the IUCN report from the public, the company has kept an environmental report in Honduras from public review. In 1995, the Honduran Centro de Estudios y Control de Contaminantes (the Center for the Study and Control of Contaminants) audited the banana industry throughout Honduras, including Chiquita plantations. Dr. Luis Munguia Guerrero, CESCCO's director, said the audit found serious problems on Chiquita's farms, but he said he could not release the report because of a confidentiality agreement signed with the company. He said, however, that Chiquita could release it if it chose. The Enquirer asked Chiquita to see the report. The company declined to release it. In a response issued through its attorneys, it stated that "CESCCO conducted an initial audit of the banana industry in 1995, identifying several general areas in which improvement was needed ... For its part, Chiquita has taken affirmative steps to address issues raised in the 1995 CESCCO report." (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; Unregistered toxins used despite claims Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita's environmental partner, the Rainforest Alliance, claims that Chiquita's "Better Banana" certified farms "only use products that are registered for use in the United States, Canada and Europe," according to the alliance's "General Production Standards" and agreed to by Chiquita. But the Enquirer found that Chiquita systematically uses chemical products on its certified farms that are not registered for use, meaning they are not allowed to be used, in the United States, Canada or one or more countries of the European Union. These pesticides include: Bitertanol, sold as Baycor: In documents provided to the Enquirer, Chiquita stated that it has used this product since 1993. According to documents provided to the Enquirer by the manufacturer - the Bayer Corporation - the pesticide is not, and never has been, registered for use in the United States. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) spokesman Albert Heier confirmed that bitertanol is not approved for use in the United States on bananas or any other crop. The pesticides' full impact on people or the environment is not known at this time because the EPA has not conducted tests on the product, Mr. Heier said. In a statement issued to the Enquirer through its attorneys, Chiquita stated that company policy "allows only for the use of agrichemicals that are approved by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for use on bananas." Denise Kearns, spokesperson for the EPA on pesticide issues, said that the EPA has set a "tolerance level" for bitertanol, that is the level of detectable pesticide residue at which the EPA will allow a crop to be imported into the United States. But this level, set after scientific review, does not constitute approval for use in the U.S. on bananas or any other crop, Ms. Kearns said. Bitertanol also is not registered for use in Canada, according to Antony Simpson, spokesman for Health Canada's Pest Management Regulatory Agency, the Canadian government's counterpart to the EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs. The pesticide is approved for use in the European Union. Chlorpyrifos, sold as Lorsban. This product is widely used by Chiquita to put in plastic bags that hang over the banana bunches as they grow. It is registered for use in the United States. However, the EPA is reviewing safety levels for all organophosphate compounds, and chlorpyrifos is one product that could be severely restricted because of health and environmental risks, according to published reports by the Washington State Department of Agriculture. Last year, the EPA declared chlorpyrifos as a "Restricted Use Product," a restriction allowing for use only under special circumstances with specific EPA approval. Chlorpyrifos is not authorized for use in Finland and Sweden, according to European Union government reports. Carbofuran, sold as Furadan: This pesticide is used to combat nematodes, small worms that attack the banana plants. Chiquita has used the product since 1975. The product is listed by the EPA as "severely restricted" in the United States. According to EPA documents, the product's high risk of danger to people and the environment make it "a pesticide for which virtually all registered uses have been prohibited by final government regulatory action," but it can still be used in some special cases. The product also is severely restricted in Canada, according to Health Canada. Its use is not authorized in Finland. Ethoprop, sold as Mocap: This organophosphate also is registered for use in the United States but is being reviewed by EPA. Like chlorpyrifos it has been singled out as facing severe restrictions, according to the Washington State Department of Agriculture. Ethoprop is not registered for use in Canada, according to Health Canada. It is not authorized for use in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg, according to European Union government reports. Terbufos, sold as Counter: This product is registered for use in the U.S., but it is being reviewed by EPA for possible restrictions. It is not authorized for use in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Portugal according to European Union government reports. Azoxystrobin, sold as Bankit: This fungicide used in aerial spraying is not registered for use in Canada, according to Health Canada. Imazalil, sold as Fungaflor: This fungacide, applied to bananas before shipment, is not registered for use in Canada, according to Health Canada. Tridemorph, sold as Calixin: This fungicide used in aerial spraying is not registered for use in Canada, according to Health Canada. It is not authorized for use in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Portugal. Where chemicals are approved for use Chiquita's environmental partner, the Rainforest Alliance, has regulations to which Chiquita has agreed that state the company cannot use chemicals on its alliance certified banana farms that are not authorized for use in the U.S., Canada and Europe. But according to Chiquita's own list of approved pesticides, it does. Chemicals: Azoxystrobin Sold as: Bankit Type: Fungicide Used for: Black Sigatoka Authorized for use in: U.S.: Yes Canada: No European Union*: Unknown Chemicals: Bitertanol Sold as: Baycor Type: Fungicide Used for: Black Sigatoka Authorized for use in: U.S.: No Canada: No European Union*: Yes Chemicals: Carbofuran Sold as: Furadan Type: Nematicide Used for: Nematodes Authorized for use in: U.S.: Yes Canada: Yes European Union*: No Chemicals: Chlorpyrifos Sold as: Lorsban Type: Insecticide Used for: Insects Authorized for use in: U.S.: Yes Canada: Yes European Union*: No Chemicals: Ethoprop Sold as: Mocap Type: Nematicide Used for: Nematodes Authorized for use in: U.S.: Yes Canada: No European Union*: No Chemicals: Imazalil Sold as: Fungaflor Type: Fungaflor Used for: Crown Rot organisms Authorized for use in: U.S.: Yes Canada: No European Union*: Yes Chemicals: Terbufos Sold as: Counter Type: Nematicide Used for: Nematodes Authorized for use in: U.S.: Yes Canada: Yes European Union*: No Chemicals: Tridemorph Sold as: Calixin Type: Fungicide Used for: Black Sigatoka Authorized for use in: U.S.: Yes Canada: No European Union*: No * A "no" in this column means that one or more of the 15 nations of the European Union do not authorize the use of this chemical on its farms. Sources: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Health Canada and European Union reports. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Environment; Workers sprayed in the fields Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- In the fiercely competitive banana trade, Chiquita Brands has made a strong effort to set itself apart as the industry's "environmental leader." Chiquita's brochures, posters and company website proudly trumpet its partnership with the Rainforest Alliance, a New York-based environmental group known worldwide for setting up environmental - business partnerships. Since 1993, the two have worked on the "ECO-O.K. - Better Banana" program, an environmental certification to assure protection for workers and the environment on Costa Rican farms of Chiquita's subsidiaries, Compania Bananera Atlantica Ltda. (COBAL) and the Chiriqui Land Company. The program, originally called "ECO-O.K." but later changed to "Better Banana," has since expanded to Chiquita subsidiary farms in Panama and Colombia. But an Enquirer investigation into Chiquita's use of pesticides on plantations shows disregard not only of the company's stated environmental guidelines and partnership agreements with the alliance, but also the safety of its tens of thousands of field workers. The Enquirer found: Aerial spraying when workers are in the fields, is a practice condemned by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), scientists and even Chiquita's environmental partner, the Rainforest Alliance. The spraying violates the rules of the "Better Banana" program. The Rainforest Alliance's policy paper on the "Better Banana" program states, "All workers and neighbors must be warned when pesticides are being applied." According to the program's general regulations, workers and neighbors are not supposed to be exposed to aerial spraying. Chiquita's subsidiaries use pesticides in Latin America that are not registered for use in the United States, Canada or Europe. They do so even though Chiquita has issued public statements and agreed to an environmental contract with the Rainforest Alliance that on its farms certified by the alliance it will "only use products that are registered for use in the United States, Canada and Europe." Chiquita subsidiary farms use pesticides in aerial spraying that are highly toxic to fish and birds, contrary to Chiquita's stated environmental policies. These findings come as the "Better Banana" project is under criticism from scientists in Central America, Europe and the United States. Chiquita's showcase environmental program has been attacked as disingenuous, superficial and unverifiable. "The changes are more aesthetic than anything else," said Catharina Wesseling, a scientist with the Karolinska Institute of Environmental Medicine in Stockholm, Sweden, and author of the book Health Effects from Pesticide Use in Costa Rica. "They don't address the real problems." However, an executive of a Washington, D.C. - based conservation group, Conservation International hired by Chiquita to visit its certified subsidiary farms called the project "very positive." Scientists critical of the program say it doesn't adequately address a problem that the entire banana industry has been wrestling with for decades: use of pesticides that endanger the health of workers, villagers or the environment in Latin America. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which is responsible for checking pesticide levels on bananas imported for American consumers, said the overwhelming majority of bananas brought into the United States and tested by the administration show pesticide residue well within safety standards set by EPA. However, scientists and environmentalists said the methods and amount of pesticide use practiced by Chiquita and other large banana growers endangers banana workers and the environment where the bananas are grown. Aerial spraying Chiquita's "Environmental Charter" states that the company works "to protect the rainforest; to maintain clean water; to minimize the use of agrochemicals; to reduce, re-use and recycle waste; to support environmental education; and to ensure our workforce is well-trained and works safely." Those guidelines also are supported by the Rainforest Alliance. But the Enquirer has found that Chiquita subsidiaries have sprayed toxic cocktails, varying mixtures of potent chemicals, on their plantations without removing workers first. These aerial sprayings can take place more than 40 times a year on plantations that are threatened by a widespread banana disease. Often these pesticides fall on workers, nearby villages, rivers or forests. Eric Holst, coordinator for the Rainforest Alliance's "Better Banana" certification program in New York, said that aerial spraying while workers are in the fields would be a violation of the certification program. "We require that workers have protection from the application of chemicals. That clearly is a violation." Through its attorneys, Chiquita provided the Enquirer with a list of chemicals it has approved for use on its banana farms. For aerial spraying, the company uses the fungicides propiconazole, benomyl, mancozeb, azoxystrobin, thiophanate-methyl, tridemorph and bitertanol. Propiconazole and benomyl have both been found to be possibly cancer-causing for humans by the EPA. Mancozeb, azoxystrobin, thiophanate-methyl and tridemorph are considered hazards to fish by the EPA. Bitertanol is not allowed for use on farms in the United States, while azoxystrobin and tridemorph are not allowed for use in Canada. A source at Chiquita's headquarters in Cincinnati provided the Enquirer with tape recordings of internal voice-mail messages, several of which dealt with the issue of aerial spraying while workers are in the fields. After the Enquirer asked Chiquita's attorneys and a Rainforest Alliance official about the company's aerial spraying policy, Robert Kistinger, president of Chiquita Banana Group based in Cincinnati, said in an Oct. 29, 1997 voice-mail message to John Ordman, Chiquita's senior vice president of finance, that he wanted officials to figure out "how quickly we can begin to implement a procedure for taking our workers out of the fields when we spray ... It is something we have to think about getting done fairly quickly." For workers, the unannounced aerial spraying is a constant fear. "Some of the workers are affected by the aerial spraying, especially with rashes," Luis Perez Jimenez, 31, a leaf cutter on COBAL's Cocobola plantation, said through a translator. "They never tell us about the aerial spraying. We just see it coming and boom, it's here." Small crop dusters will fly low over the banana trees and emit clouds of pesticides that settle over the tall, leafy plants. They also settle on workers, nearby villagers, animals, and open water. As two Enquirer reporters witnessed, on recently sprayed farms the air is heavy with a stifling chemical stench. Breathing is difficult and the pesticide residue covers everything. At Cocobola, one of COBAL's larger farms, and nearby COBAL's Gavilan farm hundreds of employees can be working in the fields at any one time. The plantation, laced with irrigation canals, is adjacent to Rio Sucio, a large river in northeast Costa Rica. Mr. Perez, through a translator, said that a white film gets all over his clothes and body when spraying occurs. "I don't get any protective clothing," said Mr. Perez, whose job is to cut diseased leaves from plants. "The white stuff gets all over my arms and on my clothes. I get a lot of rashes." Jose Gomez, 45, another worker on the Cocobola plantation, also said the planes come over with no warning. "You're just working and then suddenly you see it coming," he told the Enquirer as he stood amid lush rows of banana plants. "I try to hide under the banana leaves when I hear the planes. If the chemicals get on me, I get rashes on my back. I try to be careful when the planes come. I try to protect myself under these leaves." Mr. Gomez, through a translator, said that he was afraid of the long-term impact of the pesticides on his health, but this job was the only work he could find in the region. Under the "Better Banana" certification program touted by Chiquita, workers who apply pesticides with spray packs are supplied with protective clothing and training on how to handle pesticides. But thousands of other field workers like Mr. Gomez, who do not apply pesticides, receive no protective clothing. Enquirer reporters observed, and were told by workers, union leaders and company officials, that field workers not directly involved in the application or storage of pesticides do not receive protective clothing. Speaking of the industry-wide problem of aerial spraying on banana workers, Sandra Marquardt, an environmental consultant in San Francisco who formerly headed up Greenpeace International's efforts to stop the U.S. export of banned pesticides, said, "These airplanes come over and just nail the suckers." Dole and Del Monte, the two other large U.S. banana companies, also employ aerial spraying. But neither has joined the "Better Banana" program or publicly acknowledged any alliance with an environmental group claiming to limit workers' exposure to pesticides. In response to Enquirer questions, Chiquita, through its attorneys, issued a three-page statement on aerial spraying but did not address the issue of workers being sprayed in the fields. The company stated that the spraying was necessary to combat a banana disease called Black Sigatoka.The airborne fungus causes streaks on the plants, makes the fruit smaller and eventually kills the plant if unchecked. The attorneys said the company has hired environmental consulting groups to conduct water monitoring of nearby rivers, and those groups have found almost no contamination. Despite the concerns ex-pressed by Mr. Kistinger in his October voice-mail message, aerial spraying of fields while workers were in them was still going on four months later. In a Feb. 23 voice-mail message to Mr. Ordman, Mr. Kistinger pointed out the company's political and public relations problem with continuing aerial spraying while workers are in the fields. "One of the key focuses that we have not been successful so far ... has been the issue of aerial spraying," Mr. Kistinger said. "The environmental groups, the social groups, the NGO (non-governmental organizations) say it is not right to be spraying people when they are working in the field. ... And so far we have been able to make very little progress in this regard." Prodding his executives to develop an alternative to spraying workers, Mr. Kistinger added that there is "enormous build-up of pressure" from the public in Europe to protect banana workers. Noting that steps must be taken to curb the practice, "even if they're small at this point" it is "very necessary to do from a public relations' standpoint." Chiquita recently has created an "environmental" website on which it has posted a position paper on aerial spraying. On the website, Chiquita states that spraying is necessary to protect the banana crop. But the company stated it is working on several methods of applying the pesticides from the ground, which it claims would reduce pesticide exposure to workers and the environment. Earth College science professor Jorge Arce Portuguez said Sigatoka has become the major pest threatening the banana industry in recent years. Earth College is an agricultural science college in central Costa Rica partially funded by the U.S. government and supported by dozens of major American universities. The industry's only answer so far has been to increase the potency and regularity of aerial spraying, he said. But the disease has adapted quickly, becoming resistant to many of the chemicals. "In 1990, we controlled Sigatoka with more or less 25 to 30 aerial sprayings per year," he said. "Now, seven years later ... we are dropping by plane more than 40 times per year." Anti-Sigatoka chemicals make up the bulk of pesticides used on most banana plantations, according to Lori Ann Thrupp, senior associate and expert on sustainable agriculture at the World Resources Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank on environmental issues. Drifting pesticides In a 1996 edition of the science journal Ambio, Scott Witter, associate professor at Michigan State University's Institute of International Agriculture, and colleague Carlos Hernandez published a report on the Costa Rican banana industry that found that 15 percent of aerial pesticides completely drifted off the studied plantations because of wind; 40 percent drifted away from the plants and into the ground; and 35 percent washed off in the rain. Only 10 percent of the fungicide sprayed actually stayed on the plant. "There's considerable debate about how much drift there is," Professor Witter told the Enquirer. "We had in that article references for as much as 90 percent of it not ending up on the banana plants. Some of the transnationals say 'no, no, it's more like only 40 percent that's lost.' But still that's a lot of fungicides going off into the water supply. You have a lot of the poor folks who take their water directly from surface sources. They end up ingesting these. Costa Rica is blessed with a tremendous amount of rainfall, and so dilution in many instances becomes a solution to some of the pollution. But over time, it does tend to bio-accumulate." In a statement issued through its attorneys, Chiquita stated that it is aware of the drift problem and has worked in recent years to reduce drift by installing special pesticide spray nozzles on its airplanes and other measures. In the village of Bananito Norte, in the heart of banana country southeast of the coastal city of Limon, Esther Rodriguez Anchia lives with her husband and three children in a one-room wooden shack next to Chiquita's Super Amigo packing plant and Chiquita subsidiary plantations. When the crop dusters come over, her family is sprayed with the chemicals, she said. "There is no warning," Mrs. Rodriguez said through a translator. "It just comes, usually once a week but sometimes twice. My children get very rashy when the planes come. I just have them run inside, but we usually are stuck with the rashes. I'm very allergic myself, so it's much worse for me. I have to visit the doctor all the time.," she said. Mrs. Rodriguez, 52, said the aerial spraying has made her hate the village. "I would love to fly away from here," she said. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Life on a banana plantation; Growing Chiquita bananas: pesticides and hard work Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: Cameron McWhirter and Mike Gallagher --------------------------------------------------------------------- On farms from Mexico to Ecuador, Chiquita and its affiliates grow millions of bananas every year for consumers in North America and Europe. The fruit is grown and harvested in a labor-intensive process that involves an army of workers, lots of equipment, crop-dusting airplanes, foam cushions, string, bags, special cartons, refrigerated trucks and trains, and tons of pesticides. While production methods vary slightly from plantation to plantation, the basic operations illustrated below remain the same. This illustration is a composite plantation, drawn from Enquirer reporters' visits to Chiquita subsidiary plantations and Chiquita- affiliated farms in Honduras and Costa Rica, as well as interviews with plantation workers and environmental scientists. 1. Commercial banana plants grow from 15 to 30 feet in height and are grown in long rows on large irrigated plantations. Most bananas consumed in the United States are grown in the lowlands of Central and South America. The average banana plant produces fruit about every nine months. The stem usually grows to contain about 150 bananas. When the manager decides, the fruit is cut green from the plant and dropped carefully on the back of a worker carrying a cushion to stop any bruising of the fruit. 2. Herbicides: To kill off other plants growing around the bananas, workers apply herbicides. The chemicals are toxic and wash into the ground and ground water during rains. 3. Nematicides: To kill off nematodes, small worms that attack banana plants from the roots, workers cover the ground around the plants with nematicides. These chemicals are highly toxic and make an area extremely dangerous for 24 to 48 hours after application. 4. Banana plants do not have strong trunks, they can easily be knocked over in a tropical windstorm. To prevent 'blowdowns,' workers tie the plants down with string. 5. Aerial spraying is an integral part of pesticide application in commercial banana farming. The main purpose is to combat Black Sigatoka, an airborne fungus that can destroy a plantation's crop. In areas that are infected with the fungus, including much of Central America, airplanes may spray fields more than 40 times a year. The spray lands on the plants' upper leaves, the ground, irrigation canals, streams and rivers and nearby homes, workers and residents, scientists told the Enquirer. Workers on Chiquita subsidiary plantations and other farms producing Chiquita bananas told the Enquirer that they receive no warning when the planes come over and they often hide under banana leaves to escape the pesticide dust. Nearby villagers complain the aerial spraying often drifts into their yards, sending children running into the houses to escape rashes. Many worker villages are located close to banana plantations. 6. The water used in the in the packing plants to wash pesticides off the bananas comes from the irrigation canals and then is routed back out into the water supply. Chiquita has built berms in recent years on some plantations to limit pesticides from flowing directly into rivers. But many irrigation canals, laced throughout every plantation, remain directly exposed to pesticides. 7. Plastic bags imbedded with the powerful chemical chlorpyrifos protect the the growing fruit from insects throughout its entire gestation. In previous years,the bags were simply discarded after use, though the major banana companies have now started recycling programs. 8. At harvesting, the stem is placed on a large overhead cable system that runs throughout the plantation. Workers place foam cushions among the fruit to stop bruising. The fruit is then pushed along the cable toward the "Empacadora," the packing plant. 9. In the packing plant, workers remove the cushions. Other workers then cut the stems into smaller bunches. 10. The bunchesare then put in a "pila de seleccion," a selecting trough, where selectoras, usually women, choose the bananas and cut them further down to shipping size with small hooked knives. 11. Larger troughs called 'pilas des leches," milk troughs, wash off the pesticides applied in the fields as well as natural fluids from the banana plant. 12. New pesticides are applied to the bunches after they are placed on a conveyer belt. The new pesticides, either thiabendazole or imazalil, are applied to prevent "crown rot," a fungus that attacks the extremities of the banana bunch. On some plantations, Chiquita has installed small plastic containment systems that save money on pesticide costs and reduce worker exposure to the pesticides. But most plantations do not have this system, according to Chiquita statements issued through its attorneys to the Enquirer. 13. Boxes of banana bunches, freshly applied with pesticides, are put on large skids for shipment. On all the plantations visited by the Enquirer, most workers viewed by reporters did not wear gloves when handling the pesticide-covered bananas. 14. Trucks or trains are brought to the plant and loaded with the skids. The bananas are taken to port, where the large refrigerated containers are lifted onto ships. The ships then sail to various destinations, usually in North America or Europe. About ten days to two weeks after being harvested, the bananas are on display and for sale at local groceries. Pesticides in the banana ecosystem The ecosytem of a banana plantation is extremely wet and hot. The soil is very loose, helping the banana plants grow but also making it easy for pesticides to spread throughout the system. It often rains in these areas, flushing pesticides into the ground and water table. The banana industry's answer to this dissipation has been to apply pesticides frequently. Ways pesticides get into the environment: Air: Airplanes drop toxic chemicals regularly from the air. Pesticides fall on the plants, but also on workers, the ground and irrigation canals and streams. Ground: Workers apply pesticides to the ground around the plants. These chemicals seep into the ground with every rainfall. Water: Pesticides also get into water that is used to wash bananas in the packing plants. That water then flows back into the irrigation canals. Bags: Plastic bags with the insecicide chlorpyrifos cover all the banana bunches from their inception. The chemical leaks off the bags in rain storms and flows into the ground and water. Black Sigatoka is a banana plant disease that plagues most areas where Chiquita bananas are produced. The airborne fungus eats away at the plant leaves, turning them black. The disease shrinks the size of the frui and makes it ripen too quickly to be shipped to market. Eventually, the disease kills the plant. Some researchers are now trying to find a Sigatoka resistant banana that will still appeal to consumers, but nothing has been discovered thus far. To date, the industry's reaction to the problem has been to increase aerial spraying of powerful pesticides. The roots of the banana Humans have been cultivating bananas since almost the beginning of civilization. Varieties of the plant are referred to in ancient Chinese and Arabic manuscripts. Believed by scientists to have developed in southeast Asia more than 4,000 years ago, the plant eventually spread to other parts of Asia and into Africa. The species' scientific classification, Musaceae, comes from the Arabic word for the fruit, mu'uz. Spanish and Portuguese explorers are believed to have come into contact with the plant in their travels to West Africa, where they adopted a variation of a local term, banana. Spanish explorers brought bananas to the Americas in the 1500s. Today hundreds of banana varieties thrive in almost every tropical region of the world. But more than 90 percent of the bananas found at grocery stores in the United States and Europe are one variety, the yellow Gran Cavendish. The banana is one of the most productive plants in the world. In the right climate and weather it produces year round, and for decades at a time. The plant itself is actually an herb. What looks like a trunk of a banana "tree" is in fact densely packed leaves growing up from a base clump of roots. The plants that produce commercial Gran Cavendish bananas do not produce seeds for reproduction, and are 'sexless' perennials. Planted in rows on giant farms, they regenerate after each harvest. The plant grows a stalk, called in Latin America "la Madre" or the mother, which produces a purple stem with white flowers from its center. The stem transforms into a large 'hand' of as many as 150 bananas each. The "hand," which eventually bends over from the weight of the fruit, can weigh up to 140 pounds. The fruit is harvested before it is ripe, and cut into the bunches that are transported to grocery stands. Once the fruit is harvested, the stalk is cut and a little stalk , called "el hijo" or "offspring" in Spanish, sprouts from the same root to begin the process again. Bananas are comprised mostly of sugary carbohydrates, but it is also a source of vitamins A and C as well as potassium. (Copyright 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita SECRETS Revealed; Politics & History; "About the EU tour that this minister in Panama wants to take is just highly dangerous . . "And I was saying that we should, if we could politely do it without ruffling too many feathers, get that minister's trip cancelled. So that would be exactly my program." - Keith Lindner, Chiquita vice chairman, on canceling the trip of Panamanian foreign minister; Contributions buy influence Publication: Cincinnati Enquirer Date: May 3, 1998 By: CAMERON MCWHIRTER AND MIKE GALLAGHER --------------------------------------------------------------------- Carl Lindner is well known in this town as a big contributor to both Democrats and Republicans. What is he getting for his money? Mr. Lindner, chairman of the board and CEO of Chiquita Brands International Inc., is buying the power of the White House and Capitol Hill, according to advocates of campaign finance reform and opponents of Chiquita's trade battles with Europe. "Although he has given more to Republicans, he has also been a double giver. And double giving is the clearest evidence that this money is not about elections, it's about buying influence," said Ann McBride, president of Common Cause, the non-profit group leading the campaign for finance reform. "The way Carl Lindner has given has been to give to both parties so that no matter who wins, he'll have a place at the table." Mr. Lindner, a registered Republican who has spent at least two nights at the Clinton White House, certainly has a place at the table of the Democratic administration as well as both sides of the aisle in Congress. Mr. Lindner has made large contributions - totaling millions of dollars - to Republican and Democratic candidates over the years. But that largesse has come under scrutiny since 1993 when the European Union established trade preferences limiting how many bananas Chiquita could bring to Europe. Chiquita began asking the White House to intervene while also making large donations to the Democratic Party. In 1995, the U.S. Trade Representative's Office of the White House took the company's cause to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the first case by the United States brought before the newly created international body. The U.S. decision to take up an international case on behalf of one multinational company contributed to the recent debate about campaign finance reform. Dole and Del Monte, the two other large U.S. banana producers, did not file requests with the White House. Dole proposed a compromise in 1995 to avert the WTO action, but it was turned down. Mr. Lindner and other Chiquita officials declined repeated requests to meet with the Enquirer to discuss campaign contributions or any other subject. Through attorneys hired to deal with the Enquirer, Chiquita issued the following written statement: "Neither Carl Lindner Jr. nor any other Chiquita, United Brands, or American Financial official has ever asked for or received any promises in return for political contributions related to the WTO (World Trade Organization) proceeding or any other matter, nor have any such promises or quid pro quos (things given in exchange for something else) been anticipated or expected by Mr. Lindner or Chiquita." The White House also firmly denied any improper support for Chiquita's case because of Mr. Lindner's donations. "It's absolutely not true and has no foundation in reality," said Jay Ziegler, spokesman for the White House's trade office. But the Enquirer has obtained, through the Freedom of Information Act, correspondence between the White House, members of Congress and Chiquita dealing with the European banana issue beginning in 1994. Though many portions of the letters have been blacked out by the government, the correspondence demonstrates the influence that Chiquita exerts on the U.S. trade office. The correspondence shows that: Powerful congressional leaders sent letters to the White House pressuring the administration to support Chiquita's position. Chiquita supporters included U.S. Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, U.S. Sen. Mike DeWine, R-Ohio, U.S. Rep. and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, R-Georgia, U.S. Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, U.S. Sen. and Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., U.S. Sen. Christopher Dodd, D- Conn., and others who had received donations from either the Lindners, their controlled companies or company officials. Chief support appears to have come from Bob Dole, while he was still the senior Republican senator from Kansas. Many of these letters were faxed to the trade office by Carolyn Gleason, Chiquita's trade attorney, registered lobbyist and key liaison to the Clinton administration on this issue. On one letter from Mr. Dole dated June 21, 1995, then U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor scrawled a note to his staffers: "Please give me a way to proceed. Pressure is going to grow. MK" Chiquita's lobbyist, Ms. Gleason, sent faxes to the trade office - at the office's request - providing policy position papers on the banana issue for U.S. embassy staff around the world. Other faxes show Ms. Gleason writing legislation on this issue for the trade office to submit to the Federal Register. Staff of the White House's trade office discussed how to manage the press to Chiquita's advantage. In an e-mail message sent June 14, 1996, Ralph Ives, deputy assistant U.S. trade representative and the Clinton administration's point man on the banana issue, wrote about a segment on the trade dispute that was being planned by public television's News Hour. "Chiquita is urging that we either try to kill this (preferable, but not sure how) or either Peter (Allgeier, a trade office staffer) or I agree to be interviewed....I will find out more after talking with Chiquita." The segment never ran. Producers at the News Hour told the Enquirer that they did some initial reporting on the subject but never planned to air a segment on the dispute. Mr. Lindner held at least two meetings with high-level staff of the White House. In addition, Chiquita's lobbyist, Ms. Gleason, had frequent contact with the office. In one letter, dated July 19, 1995, Mr. Lindner, and his son, Keith, wrote to Mickey Kantor that they hoped to meet soon to discuss "our larger case strategy and to discuss our mutual efforts in greater detail." They had meetings before and after the letter. Senators, including Mr. Glenn, also met with Mr. Kantor on Chiquita's behalf. Tape-recorded internal Chiquita voice-mails, provided to the Enquirer by a company source, also show the influence that Chiquita has with the White House's trade office. In a Jan. 30 message from Keith Lindner, Chiquita's vice chairman, to Steven G. Warshaw, company president and chief operating officer; Robert Olson, chief counsel; Ms. Gleason and others, Mr. Lindner recommended that Chiquita try to cancel the trip of Panamanian Foreign Minister Ricardo Alberto Arias to the European Union. "About the EU tour that this minister in Panama wants to take is just highly dangerous," Keith Lindner said, adding later, "And I was saying that we should, if we could politely do it without ruffling too many feathers, get that minister's trip canceled. So that would be exactly my program." Later that day, Ms. Gleason called Mr. Olson and others with a voice-mail message stating the trip had indeed been canceled. A Chiquita consultant met with the Panamanian minister and convinced him that the U.S. trade office could not meet with him on Monday, but only later in the week, she said. The later meeting meant the minister would not have time to travel to the EU. Ms. Gleason then learned that the U.S. trade office had scheduled a meeting for Monday. "USTR (the trade office) went ahead and scheduled a meeting on Monday," she said. "That has since been corrected." The trade office moved the meeting with Mr. Arias from Monday to Wednesday, meaning the minister would not have time to visit Europe, according to Ms. Gleason's voice-mail message. In a statement issued through its attorneys, Chiquita stated, "Chiquita never asked the United States Trade Representative to reschedule meetings with the Panamanian foreign minister." Minister Counselor Fernando Eleta at the Panamanian Embassy in Washington, D.C., said he could not believe "Chiquita would do something like that." He said he would withhold comment, however, until he had a chance to review the Enquirer article. Today, Chiquita plays a major role in formulating U.S. banana trade policy. At the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ba-nana conference in Rome last May, the U.S. delegation consisted of three U.S. trade diplomats and four other people listed as "advisers." The advisers were Michael O'Brien, president of European Offices of Chiquita; Manuel Rodriguez, Chiquita's assistant general counsel from Cincinnati; Ms. Gleason; and Robert Moore, the head of a banana trade group that represents the entire industry. No one from Del Monte or Dole was represented on the U.S. delegation. According to the head of the FAO's Intergovernmental Group on Bananas, delegation advisers are chosen by the individual governments. Through Ms. Gleason, a partner in the law firm of McDermott, Will & Emery, Chiquita presents its views in meetings and telephone calls with Amy Wynton, chief of Agriculture for the State Department and other top Clinton officials. The Chiquita-State Department connection extends even further. When an Enquirer reporter called the U.S. Embassy in Honduras to ask about a former embassy staffer now working for Chiquita, embassy staff said they could not provide the information. According to an internal, tape-recorded voice-mail message obtained by the Enquirer from a company source, embassy staff informed Chiquita of the call later that same day. Washington favors Opponents of Chiquita's actions in Washington, D.C. say Chiquita has bought White House support for a cause that will hurt U.S. allies only to help the bottom line of the Cincinnati company. "It's a clear issue of buying trade favors," said Randall Robinson, the head of TransAfrica Forum, a Washington, D.C.-based lobbying group for African and developing world issues. "The President ought to be ashamed of himself." Mr. Robinson, initially a supporter of President Clinton, and his wife, Hazel Ross-Robinson, have taken up the trade issue because they feel that if Chiquita can remove Europe's banana protections, developing economies in the Caribbean and Africa will be severely damaged. Ms. Ross-Robinson, who lobbies for Caribbean countries in Washington, D.C., has organized visits by several political leaders to the Caribbean islands to meet with farmers and has brought farmers from the Caribbean and Africa to lobby Congress. Mr. Robinson, the leader of the successful boycott effort of apartheid South Africa in the 1980s, has twice dumped bananas as a protest in Washington, D.C. to call attention to what he sees as the White House sellout. At his urging, prominent black Americans, including Bill Cosby and Jesse Jackson, have written the White House to express concern about the Clinton administration's support for Chiquita's position. Mr. Robinson and other Chiquita opponents point to April 1994, when Mr. Lindner and his associates contributed hundreds of thousands of